PRODUCTS LIABILITY-PHysicAL INJURY TO PROPERTY AND
CONSEQUENT ECONOMIC Loss; STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT.
Seely v. White Motor Co. (Cal. 1965).
In October 1959 plaintiff purchased from a dealer a new truck
manufactured by defendant. Defendant's express warranty stated
that the vehicle was "free from defects in material and workmanship
under normal use and service." This warranty was exclusive of all
other warranties and was limited to "making good" at defendant's
factory any parts which proved defective in material or workmanship.
Plaintiff soon discovered that the truck bounced violently, a condition known as "galloping." Repeated attempts by the manufacturer
and the dealer failed to correct the defect. In July 1960 the brakes
failed and the truck overturned. Although no personal injury to
plaintiff resulted, it cost him $5,466.09 to have the truck repaired.
Plaintiff brought suit against both the manufacturer and the dealer,
later dismissing the action against the dealer without prejudice. The
trial court refused to allow any recovery for damages resulting from
the accident because plaintiff had failed to establish any causal connection between the "galloping" defect and the accident. However,
on the basis of a breach of the express warranty, the court allowed
recovery for plaintiff's payments on the truck and for business losses
which resulted from the "galloping" defect. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of California affirmed and allowed recovery for the damages
awarded by the trial court based on defendant's breach of the express
warranty, but rejected the contention that plaintiff could recover for
all economic loss based on strict liability in tort. However, the court
stated in dicta that if the defect in the truck had been proven to be
the cause of the accident, recovery would have been allowed based on
strict liability in tort, as that doctrine governs physical injury to
plaintiff's property as well as personal injury. Seely v. White Motor
Co., 63 Adv. Cal. 1, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
Recently, there have been two major developments in the California law of products liability. The Uniform Commercial Code,
which became effective in California on January 1, 1965, revised in
certain instances the statutory law of breach of warranties.' In addition, contemporary judicial decisions have formulated the doctrine
of strict liability in tort The function of the former is to replace the
1 Compare CAL. COMM'L CODE §§ 2311-17, 2607, 2714-15 with Cal. Stat. 1931, ch.
1070, §§ 1731-35, at 2238-39, § 1749, at 2249, §§ 1789-90, at 2255-56.

2 See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
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Uniform Sales Acte in governing commercial transactions; that of
the latter is to protect the consumer from injuries caused by defectively manufactured products by allowing recovery for such injuries
against both the manufacturer and the retailer.4
The first California cases which enunciated the doctrine of strict
liability in tort were limited by the facts of each case to personal
injuries.5 Accordingly, questions regarding the limitations on the
doctrine were not considered by the court. Nevertheless, the extension of strict liability in tort to physical injury to property was not
unforeseeable.6
The defendant in Seely contended that its obligation to replace or
repair defective parts was expressly in lieu of all other warranties and
thus was an effective disclaimer of all liability for damages for breach
of warranty. The court held, however, that by failing to correct the
defect as promised, the defendant incurred liability for the breach of
its promise as a breach of warranty and that recovery properly included lost profits as well as the amount paid on the purchase price.
It was also contended that the doctrine of strict liability in tort
superseded the statutory provisions relative to liability based on
breach of warranty. Chief Justice Traynor, speaking for six members of the court, rejected this contention. He stated that the statutory
provisions relative to breach of warranty frustrate rational compensation for physical injuries and that for this reason the doctrine of
strict liability was designed specifically to govern the problem of
physical injuries. However, the opinion asserts that actions for breach
of warranty do serve a distinct function in the commercial world and
that the rules regarding breach of warranties do provide specific
criteria for determining the liability which arises as a result of the
896 (1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
3 Cal. Stat. 1931, ch. 1070 (now CAL. COMM'L CODE).
4 See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
t
896 (1964); c . Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d
897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963) ; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d
453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (concurring opinion); Prosser, Strict Liability To
The Consumer, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1122 (1960).
5 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 4; Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., supra note 4.
6 See Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road To and
Past Vandermark, 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 30, 59 (1965); Prosser, supra note 4, at 1143.
7 Citing Rose v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 212 Cal. App. 2d 755, 28 Cal. Rptr. 185
(1963); Allen v. Brown, 181 Kan. 301, 310 P.2d 923 (1957); see Cal. Stat. 1931,
ch. 1070 §§ 1789-90, at 2255-56 (now CAL. COMM'L CODE §§ 2714-15). See generally
Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 1419 (1965).
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economic relationship between suppliers and consumers. The Code8
therefore allows a manufacturer or supplier to disclaim or limit
warranties,9 and in addition it prescribes certain requirements of
privity'0 and of seasonable notice of breach. 1 If strict liability were
to supersede this area of sales law, unmerchantability12 alone would
make applicable the doctrine of strict liability in tort and the manufacturer could be held liable for damages of an unknown and unlimited scope. For example, truckers such as the plaintiff in Seely
could recover business losses resulting from the improper operation
of their trucks even though the manufacturer disclaimed all warranties and even though there was no physical damage to either
person or property. The rules of warranty in such a case give a
certain deserved protection to the manufacturer, for he cannot fairly
be charged with the risk that the product will in all cases meet each
consumer's individual needs.
8 CAL. COMM'L CODE.
9 CAL. COMM'L CODE §§ 2316.
10 Traditionaly an action for breach of warranty has required privity of contract.

But over the years the courts have developed many exceptions to this requirement. See
Prosser, supra note 4. Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code attempted to
give limited effect to these exceptions in personal injury cases. However, when
adopting the Uniform Commercial Code, California omitted § 2-318, for at that time
California had already gone beyond the limitations of that section in a number of
cases involving personal injury. Marsh & Warren, Report on Proposed Amendments
To The Uniform Commercial Code, SENATE FA cT FINDING COMM,.

ON JUDICIARY,

SIXTH PROGRESS REPORT To THE LEGISLATURE, PART 1-THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE, ch. VII 436, 457-58 (1961); see Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339,

353 P.2d 575, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1960); Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d
272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939); Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602,
6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960). These cases were the springboard for the California
Supreme Court to make the leap to strict liability in tort which completely eliminated
the privity requirement in cases involving personal injury. Now that strict liability in
tort has become a separate cause of action, the question arises whether the previous
exceptions to the privity requirement are still alive in California breach of warranty
law. Apparently not. The exceptions to the privity requirement were created to meet
the exigencies of personal injury litigation. Since strict liability in tort seems to have
replaced breach of warranty in California personal injury Itigation, the previous exceptions to the privity requirement would no longer seem to be applicable in breach of
warranty actions. See 2 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 165 (1965).
Moreover, the privity requirement is implicit in the California Commercial Code.
Under § 2313 express warranties are created when made "by the seller to the buyer"
or when "made a part of the basis of the bargain." Under § 2314 the implied warranty
of merchantability is implied in the contract for their sale. Under § 2315 the implied
warranty of fitness for particular purpose is also a part of the contract of sale. Thus
any liability for breach of warranty would not seem to extend beyond the provisions
of the contract of sale, whether these provisions be express or implied. This limitation
is in effect a requirement of privity of contract.
11 CAL. COMM'L CODE § 2607(3).
12 See generally CAL. COMM'. CODE § 2314; UNIFORM COMM'L CODE § 2-314;
Prosser, The Implied Warranty of MerchantableQuality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 117 (1943).
In general, "unmerchantable" may be thought of as meaning defective.
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The reason given in the Seely dicta for extending the doctrine of
strict liability in tort to cases of physical injury to plaintiff's property
is: "Physical injury to property is so akin to personal injury that there
is no reason for distinguishing them."'1 3 However, the opinion does
not expressly state the extent of recovery which will be allowed for
such damage. Viewing the court's opinion narrowly, one could conclude that recovery will be limited to personal injury losses and to
the cost of repairing physical damage to plaintiff's property. Conceivably, however, the court would, if the case arose, extend strict
liability in tort to allow recovery also for economic' 4 losses which
proximately' 5 flow from physical injury to property as well as to
person. This argument is supported by the rationale of the doctrine,
by an analogy to actions based on negligence, and by an analysis of
the Seely opinion.
The primary purpose of the doctrine of strict liability in tort is to
provide an effective remedy against the manufacturer or supplier of
a defective product to consumers who are injured because of the
defect.' Since economic losses, such as lost profits and earnings, can
be as pecuniarily injurious as medical expenses or repair bills, including the former in the scheme of recovery would comport with the
ritionale of the theory.
Recovery based on strict liability is a tort action, and as in an action
in tort based on negligence it must be proved that the damages were
caused by the defective product. Likewise, it would appear that the
scope of recoverable damages would also be the same. In negligence
cases economic losses are compensable when they flow from an accident or physical injury to person or property.' 7 Accordingly, recovery
38 63 Adv. Cal. at 11, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.

14 The term economic loss is meant to include pecuniary damages resulting from
loss of use, loss of earnings, loss of profits, and loss of value.
15 See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3333 which states: "'For the breach of an obligation not

arising from contract, the measure of damages except where otherwise expressly provided by this code, is the amount which will compensate for all the detriment proxi-

mately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or not."

10 See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,
462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (concurring opinion); Prosser, supra note 4, at 1122.
17 See Guido v. Hudson Transit Lines, 178 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1949) (special damages for loss of use of truck and bulldozer); Reynolds v. Bank of America, 53 Cal. 2d
49, 345 P.2d 926 (1959) (special damages for loss of rental value of airplane) ; Caso
v. Heboin, 55 Cal. App. 601, 203 Pac. 1025 (3d Dist. 1921) (special damages for

loss of use of truck); Paguio v. Evening Journal Ass'n, 127 NJ.L. 144, 21 A.2d 667
(Sup. Ct. 1941) (special damages for loss of dog trained for vaudeville); cf. International Harvester Co. v. Sharoff, 202 F.2d 52 (10th Cir. 1953); Fentress v. Van Etta
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based on strict liability in tort should also include the same items of
damage.
Significantly, the court relied on cases involving negligence 8 in
determining that the doctrine of strict liability in tort did not allow
for recovery of solely economic losses. Thus, following the negligence rule, the court held that strict liability is limited to damages
for physical injuries and that there is no liability for economic loss
alone. 19 However, the opinion did not state that there is to be no
recovery for those economic losses which are caused by physical
injuries to property. Moreover, in saying "physical injury to property
is so akin to personal injury that there is no reason for distinguishing
them,"2 ° the language intimates that since one may recover for

economic losses which stem from personal injury,21 so too may one
recover in strict liability in tort for economic loss caused by physical
injury to property.
Conspicuously absent from the opinion is any explanation of the
phrases "physical injury to property" and "economic loss alone."
However, the court provides some clarification by citing two cases in
which liability for negligence was denied. In Wyatt v. CadillacMotor
Car Div.22 an automobile manufacturer negligently sealed some
wrapping paper in the "breather pipe" of an automobile engine.
This eventually caused the car to be completely ruined. The court
held that a manufacturer is not liable for negligence unless there is
bodily injury or damage to other property. 3 In Trans World Airlines
v. Curtiss-WrightCorp.24 a defect in some airplane engines rendered
the engines worthless. There was no accident. It was held that there
is no liability for negligence unless there is a resulting accident. 25
Motors, 157 Cal. App. 2d 863, 323 P.2d 227 (Super. Ct., App. Dept. 1958); Quackenbush v. F6rd Motor Co., 167 App. Div. 433, 153 N.Y. Supp. 131 (1915).
18 Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 145 Cal. App. 2d 423, 302 P.2d 665 (1956);
Trans World Airlines v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct. 1955),
aff'd mem., 153 N.Y.S.2d 550 (App. Div. 1956).
19 63 Adv. Cal. at 10, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
20 Id. at 11, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
21 In his dissenting opinion Justice Peters says that strict liability in tort allows
personal injury damages and that "such an award may include compensation for past
loss of time and earnings due to the injury (Storrs v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 134
Cal. 91, 93, 66 P. 72) for loss of future earning capacity (Bonneau v. North Shore
R.R. Co., 152 Cal. 406, 414, 93 P. 106), and for increased living expenses caused by
the injury (Kline v. Santa Barbara etc. Ry. Co., 150 Cal. 741, 748-49, 90 P. 125)."
22 145 Cal. App. 2d 423, 302 P.2d 665 (1956).
23 Id. at 426, 302 P.2d at 667.
24 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct. 1955), af/'d mem., 153 N.Y.S.2d 550 (App. Div.
1956).
25 Id. at 290.
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Other cases have allowed recovery for damage to the defective
product itself when there has been an accompanying accident. 26 The
language of the cases also indicates that recovery is allowed when a
defective product causes damage to other property even though there
has been no accident.2 7 In the light of these cases the phrase "physical
injury to property" seems to limit liability to cases in which there is
an accident or physical damage to property other than the defective
product itself. Pecuniary losses resulting from the defectiveness
itself, 28 or from mere deterioration,2 9 or even from complete ruin
brought about by internal defect3 0 seem to be considered "solely economic" and therefore not recoverable in tort.
Justice Peters, in a well-reasoned dissenting opinion, contended
that the line which the majority was drawing between physical injury
and economic loss was an arbitrary one. He maintained that strict
liability in tort should be extended to allow recovery to the ordinary
consumer for all pecuniary losses caused by a defective product. In
effect, unmerchantability 3' alone would make applicable the doctrine
of strict liability in tort and the only restriction on recovery other
than the requirement of causation would be the requirement that the
consumer be "ordinary."' 2 It cannot be denied that this theory comports with the purpose of the strict liability theory, as strict liability
was designed to shield the otherwise poorly protected consumer from
26 International Harvester Co. v. Sharoff, 202 F.2d 52 (10th Cir. 1953); Fentress
v. Van Etta Motors, 157 Cal. App. 2d 863, 323 P.2d 227 (Super. Ct., App. Dept.

1958); Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 167 App. Div. 433, 153 N.Y. Supp. 131

(1915).

27 The Wyatt case stated that negligence required either bodily injury or damage to
other property. 145 Cal. App. 2d at 426, 302 P.2d at 667. This requirement of damage
to other property would seem to be met by the facts of Gladiola Biscuit Co. v. Southern
Ice Co., 267 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1959). In Gladiola snow ice was used to reduce the

temperature of dough in the manufacture of frozen biscuits. The ice contained glass
which became mixed with the dough. Although it could be said that there was no

accident involved, "other property" was completely ruined and under the Wyatt rule
an action for negligence would seem to lie.
28 Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Adv. Cal. 1, 10, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17, 27 (1965). Contra, Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305

(1965).
29 Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157 Cal. App. 2d 863, 866, 323 P.2d 227, 229

(Super. Ct., App. Dept. 1958)

(dictum); Trans World Airlines v. Curtiss-Wright

Corp., 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct. 1955), aff'd mem., 153 N.Y.S.2d 550 (App. Div.
1956) (by implication).
30 Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 145 Cal. App. 2d 423, 302 P.2d 665 (1956);

Fentress v. Van Etta Motors, 157 Cal. App. 2d 863, 866, 323 P.2d 227, 229 (Super.
Ct., App. Dept. 1958) (dictum).
S1
32

See generally authorities cited note 12 supra.
Justice Peters says that judicial definition of the term "ordinary consumer" should

be done on a case-by-case basis, as is customarily done with any new doctrine. 63 Adv.
Cal. at 20, 403 P.2d at 158, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 30 (dissenting opinion).
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the strict requirements of the world of commerce. To be consistent
with its purpose, argues the dissenting opinion, the strict liability
rule should allow the "ordinary" consumer recovery for all economic
losses, for in a given case such losses can indeed be an overwhelming
misfortune.
The Seely court, although leaving the door open to economic
losses resulting from physical injury to property as well as to person,
refused to extend strict liability in tort to include solely economic
loss because the manufacturer would then be liable for damages of
unknown and unlimited scope. But Justice Peters' plan would limit
the scope by restricting recovery based on strict liability to the "ordinary" consumer. Another reason for the majority's refusal to extend
the doctrine further seems to have been its unwillingness to exceed
the recovery limitations of negligence actions. As indicated previously, negligence and strict liability in tort are closely related. There
is no reason for them to have different rules as to either causation or
damages. Justice Peters made out a good case for extending strict
liability to cover solely economic losses. Others have set forth strong
arguments for a similar extension of recoverable damages in negligence actions.83 In time further extensions will probably be made,
but when they are, strict liability in tort and negligence should advance together. Not only would such a coincident development be
logical but it would also be a help towards clarification of a confusing area of tort law.
EDWARD V. BRENNAN
33 See Note, Negligent Interference With Economic Expectancy; The Case for Recovery, 16 STAN. L. REv. 664 (1964).

